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Abstract
Using a simple downstream duopoly model with vertical relations and downstream
R&D, we investigate the e®ect of non-assertion of patents (NAP) provisions. A monopoly
upstream ¯rm decides whether to employ NAP provisions. If it does so, it freely incor-
porates the R&D outcomes into its inputs. Incorporation improves the e±ciency of the
downstream ¯rms' production. We have interpreted the introduction of NAP provisions
as a source of technology spillover. Using the technologies of two downstream ¯rms is
optimal for the upstream ¯rm if and only if the degree of technology spillover is small. In
addition, if the ex ante cost di®erence between the downstream ¯rms is signi¯cant, such
technology spillovers erode both the pro¯t of the e±cient downstream ¯rm and social
welfare. We interpret our result in the context of an actual antitrust case related to this
model.
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1 Introduction
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter, \JFTC") decided to conduct a hearing into
Microsoft Japan (hereinafter, \MS") on September 1, 2004, and delivered its decision in ac-
cordance with the Antimonopoly Act on September 16, 2008. The JFTC found the following
violation of the Act. When MS directly negotiated with personal computer production/sales
¯rms in Japan from January 1, 2001, to July 31, 2004, to enter into contracts licensing
OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) sales of MS Windows (\OS"), it forced the li-
censed OEM suppliers (hereinafter, \OEM suppliers") to pledge not to ¯le lawsuits against
MS or other licensees on the grounds that Windows infringes a patent right (non-assertion
of patents provisions; hereinafter, these provisions are referred to as \NAP provisions"). In
addition, MS set contract terms with OEM suppliers that would unduly restrain their busi-
ness activities. MS abandoned the NAP provisions in direct contracts from August 1, 2004,
but the NAP provisions in contracts that were to expire by July 31, 2004, remained in e®ect
even after August 2004. The JFTC ruled that these actions had a negative impact on fair
competition in the PC/AV (Personal Computer/Audio Visual) technology exchange market,
prevented fair competition under Paragraph 13 (Trading on Restrictive Terms) of the Unfair
Trade Practices (JFTC notice #15 in 1982) and violated Article 19 of the Antimonopoly
Act.
In the MS case, the main issues were as follows.
1. Whether OEM suppliers were forced to enter into direct contracts containing NAP
provisions.
2. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D ac-
tivities concerning PC/AV technologies before July 31, 2004.
3. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D ac-
tivities concerning PC/AV technologies even after August 1, 2004.
4. Whether the NAP provisions would have a negative impact on competition in PC/AV
technology trading or PC markets.
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5. Whether the NAP provisions were justi¯ed.
6. Whether a cease and desist order was appropriate.
For the purpose of this paper, we set up a simple theoretical model to examine issues
2 to 4 above and investigate whether the JFTC decision was appropriate. This paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y describes the NAP provisions that provide incentives
for our study and related articles. Section 3 explains the model. Section 4 sets out the main
results. Section 5 compares the analytical results with the information described in Section
2. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Motivating case and related articles
2.1 The MS case
The outline of the NAP provisions in Windows OEM sales contracts is as follows (the text
is taken from the JFTC decision)
Content of the NAP provisions The NAP provisions in the direct contract
entered into in 2001 are set forth in (d) of Article 8 of BTD (Microsoft Business
Terms Document for OEM customers) for Large Accounts with Third-Party In-
staller Rights and have the following content, generally speaking.
If an invention used in the \product" licensed to OEM suppliers based on
the license agreement or in the \product" version licensed to OEM suppliers in
accordance with the license agreement is also employed in a future product, a
replacement-use product or successor product of such a \product," the OEM sup-
plier shall agree that (A) it will not ¯le a lawsuit and (B) it will not initiate action
against, prosecute, support, or participate in any kind of judicial, administrative,
or other proceedings against Microsoft and its a±liate ¯rms or their licensees in
terms of infringement of the \OEM supplier's patent" that might arise in the
\immunity period" resulting from production, use, sales, or distribution of the
future product, replacement-use product, or successor products.
On the surface, this provision appears to be advantageous only for MS, but it may lead
to technology leakage. If MS improves its OS technologies using an OEM supplier's R&D
outcomes, it may yield positive impacts both for MS and for OEM suppliers, but the possible
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e®ects of such technology leakage are not simple. This is because such positive impacts would
vary, depending on how they spill out and who would bene¯t from them. In fact, MS raised
the following objection.
It is unreasonable to recognize the NAP provisions as a violation of the Anti-
monopoly Act for the following reasons.
The NAP provisions are reasonable provisions commonly used by technology-
related ¯rms, including those in the AV consumer electronics industry, to mitigate
risks of patent infringement lawsuits and reduce the costs necessary to mitigate
such risks while disseminating new technologies. Because the NAP provisions
would, by de¯nition, prevent patent infringement lawsuits, they could poten-
tially reduce corporate willingness to engage in R&D e®orts. In principle, if such
an abstract possibility is illegal, this is tantamount to recognizing that the NAP
provisions are in themselves illegal. However, as mentioned above, they have
reasonable objectives. If the JFTC recognizes as illegal the NAP provisions that
are widely used in the industry, speci¯c reasons are necessary under competition
law to justify this decision. If the JFTC regards the NAP provisions as illegal
without speci¯c criteria to justify the illegality of the NAP provisions, our indus-
try, which has been using the NAP provisions, will inevitably become confused.
This will have signi¯cantly detrimental e®ects and seriously confuse legitimate
intellectual property licensing practices. In addition, OEM suppliers have also
bene¯ted from the NAP provisions over many years because they have engaged
in business operations without concern for patent lawsuits. OEM suppliers ex-
pect the NAP provisions to apply to themselves and other OEM suppliers. The
JFTC's decision to overturn the NAP provisions will destroy such expectations.
Furthermore, the NAP provisions are an important element of the compen-
sation that OEM suppliers provide in return for licenses of the Windows series.
The NAP provisions also serve to maintain OEM suppliers' royalty payments
at a low level. For this reason, if the JFTC decision is applied retroactively, it
would void the NAP provisions. All OEM suppliers that wish to void the NAP
provisions while bene¯ting from low royalty payments should return such pro¯ts
to MS. Without such a provision, the JFTC decision would be unjust.
It is obviously necessary to pay due attention to international harmonization
when enforcing competition law. MS employs NAP provisions worldwide. Corpo-
rations all over the world, including Japanese ¯rms, also use NAP provisions on a
global scale. In such situations, the competition authority should avoid problems
in applying a legal principle to the same kind of trading practices. Without these
NAP provisions, global corporations, including the so-called AV consumer elec-
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tronics industry, face uncertainty when they plan licensing or trading practices
in accordance with applicable legal standards.
As mentioned earlier, this trial was to examine whether the NAP provisions violated
the Antimonopoly Act, not to judge their legality. For this reason, the arguments of MS
were ruled to be inappropriate. Considering these facts, we analyze the e®ects of MS' NAP
provisions by establishing a simple model to describe the situation detailed above.
2.2 Main results and related work
We now describe the model setting and the results in this paper. This article assumes
that MS is an upstream ¯rm while OEM suppliers are downstream ¯rms. A monopoly
upstream ¯rm supplies an input to two downstream ¯rms. The two downstream ¯rms supply
their ¯nal products to consumers and engage in cost-reducing R&D. We assume that if
the upstream ¯rm employs NAP provisions, it freely incorporates R&D outcomes into its
inputs. Incorporation of R&D improves the e±ciency of the downstream ¯rms' production.
We interpret the introduction of NAP provisions as a source of technology spillover. The
theoretical model yields the following result. Using the technologies of the two downstream
¯rms is optimal for the upstream ¯rm as long as the degree of technology spillover is small.
If the spillover is large, the upstream ¯rm should not introduce NAP provisions from the
viewpoint of pro¯t. In addition, if the ex ante cost di®erence between the downstream ¯rms
is signi¯cant, such technology spillover erodes both the pro¯t of the e±cient downstream
¯rm and social welfare.
We review several articles related to our paper. A seminal article in the ¯eld of research
joint venture including spillover e®ects is that of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). They
show that cooperative behavior can play a positive role in oligopoly industries. The positive
and normative e®ects of cooperative R&D are examined by Suzumura (1992), who ¯nds that,
in the presence of su±ciently large R&D spillovers, neither noncooperative nor cooperative
equilibria achieve even second-best R&D levels. In the absence of spillover e®ects, however,
while the cooperative R&D level remains socially insu±cient, the noncooperative level may
overshoot the ¯rst- and second-best levels of R&D.
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Some articles discuss technology investments in oligopoly models with vertical relations.
Ishii (2004) extends the model of Suzumura (1992). He examines the e®ects of cooperative
R&D in two vertically related duopolies, which are two ¯nal-good manufacturers and two
input suppliers, with horizontal and vertical spillovers. Vertical R&D cartels yield a larger
social surplus than noncooperative R&D. If the horizontal spillover rate between the input
suppliers is insu±ciently high, vertical R&D cartels yield a larger social surplus than hor-
izontal ones. Regarding information ¯rewalls, Milliou (2004) considers the case in which
information °ows from a downstream nonintegrated ¯rm to the downstream division of a
vertically integrated ¯rm via its upstream subsidiary. In a setting where both the integrated
and the nonintegrated ¯rms engage in cost-reducing R&D and compete in the product mar-
ket, she shows that the impact of the R&D information °ow on innovation, output, and
pro¯ts is positive for the integrated ¯rm and negative for the nonintegrated ¯rm. These
papers do not consider the structures of technology spillover to be exogenously given.1
The following papers consider market structures in which downstream ¯rms determine
the degree of technology spillover, but not vertical market structures.2 The role of a research
joint venture is analyzed by Poyago-Theotoky (1999), who shows that when spillovers of in-
formation are treated as endogenous, ¯rms never disclose any information when determining
the degree of R&D spillover noncooperatively. Gil-Molt¶o et al. (2005) investigate the e®ect
of technology distance between two ¯rms engaging in cost-reducing R&D investments with
technology spillover.3 In their model, the technology distance is endogenously determined
They show that the two ¯rms are noncooperatively interested in using very similar (or the
same) R&D technologies in order to obtain a very high degree of spillovers. Milliou (2009)
also extends the discussion in Poyago-Theotoky (1999) by changing the timing of the deci-
sions concerning the degree of technology spillover. She shows that even if each ¯rm protects
its technology without cost, it sometimes chooses not to protect the outcomes of its R&D
1 Versaevel and Vencatachellum (2009) incorporate strategic delegation into a model with technology
leakage.
2 Moreover, in our paper, the upstream monopolist determines the degree of technology spillover.
3 Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) investigate this matter in the context of spatial competition.
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investments because ¯rms enjoy higher total cost reduction without such protection.4
3 The model
Two downstream ¯rms supply their ¯nal products to consumers. A monopoly upstream
¯rm supplies an input to the two downstream ¯rms. The downstream and upstream ¯rms
represent OEM suppliers and MS, respectively, as described in the previous sections. Each
downstream ¯rm needs one unit of input to produce one unit of ¯nal product. The upstream
¯rm o®ers a common wholesale price, w, to the downstream ¯rms. The marginal cost of the
upstream ¯rm is cu, which is a positive constant.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the products of the downstream ¯rms are
homogeneous and that the ¯rms compete in quantity. The inverse demand function for the
¯nal products is given as:
p = a¡ x1 ¡ x2; (1)
where p is market price, a is a positive constant, and xk represents the output of downstream
¯rm k (k = 1; 2). Note that we assume a to be large enough to secure an interior solution in
equilibrium. The constant marginal cost of downstream ¯rm k is given as:
ck = ¹ck ¡ ek ¡ °kej ;
where ¹ck is the ex ante marginal cost, ek and ej represent the e®ort levels of downstream
¯rms k and j, respectively, and °k represents the degree of R&D spillover from downstream
¯rm j to k (k; j = 1; 2, j 6= k). The ex ante marginal costs of the ¯rms are ¹c1 = c and
¹c2 = c+d, where c and d are positive constants. That is, downstream ¯rm 1 is more e±cient
than downstream ¯rm 2. These e®ort levels are endogenously determined by the downstream
¯rms. When downstream ¯rm k makes an e®ort ek, it incurs an investment cost of Áe2k where
Á is a positive constant. We impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 We assume that Á ¸ 1 to satisfy the second-order conditions of optimal ek
4 In Milliou (2009), an asymmetry between a ¯rm's outgoing spillovers and its incoming spillovers can
occur. This property is di®erent from the previous papers.
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(k = 1; 2). We also assume that d · (a¡ c)(12Á¡ 7)=(42Á¡ 7) to ensure that the quantities
supplied by the downstream ¯rms are positive.
The upstream ¯rm is able to choose the degree of R&D spillover, °k (k = 1; 2). If the
upstream ¯rm absorbs technology from downstream ¯rm k, the degree of R&D spillover
from downstream ¯rm k to j becomes ° where ° is a positive constant (0 · ° · 1). This
assumption captures the following technology leakage. Technology from a downstream ¯rm
(an OEM supplier) is incorporated into the input of the upstream ¯rm (OS produced by
MS). The incorporation positively in°uences the marginal cost of another downstream ¯rm
(an OEM supplier). This means that this technological improvement in the input (OS)
solves production problems that downstream ¯rms (OEM suppliers) face. In this case, the
upstream ¯rm has four options regarding absorption of technology from downstream ¯rms:
(i) not absorbing the technology, (ii) absorbing the technology from downstream ¯rm 1, (iii)
absorbing the technology from downstream ¯rm 2, and (iv) absorbing the technologies from
both downstream ¯rms. Note that depending on the upstream ¯rm's decision concerning
technology absorption, asymmetric R&D spillover can occur. We also suppose that the
upstream ¯rm can commit to this choice. That is, given the choice by the upstream ¯rm,
each downstream ¯rm engages in R&D investment. Figure 1 shows the market structure in
this model.
[Figure 1]
The decision-making process in this setting is as follows. First, the upstream ¯rm decides
the technological source from which it obtains the technology. Second, each downstream
¯rm decides its investment level ek. Third, the upstream ¯rm decides the wholesale price w.
Finally, each downstream ¯rm decides its output xk.
4 Analysis
We solve the game by backward induction.
In the ¯nal stage, given °k, ek (k = 1; 2), and w, the pro¯t of each downstream ¯rm is
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as follows:
¼1 =(a¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ (c¡ e1 ¡ °2e2)¡ w)x1 ¡ Áe21; (2)
¼2 =(a¡ x1 ¡ x2 ¡ (c+ d¡ e2 ¡ °1e1)¡ w)x2 ¡ Áe22: (3)
On the basis of the maximization condition for each downstream ¯rm, the output of each
downstream ¯rm is calculated as follows:
x1(°1; °2; e1; e2; w) =
a¡ c+ d+ (2¡ °1)e1 ¡ (1¡ 2°2)e2 ¡ w
3
; (4)
x2(°1; °2; e1; e2; w) =
a¡ c¡ 2d+ (2¡ °2)e2 ¡ (1¡ 2°1)e1 ¡ w
3
: (5)
The pro¯t function of the upstream ¯rm is given as:
¼u = (w ¡ cu)(x1(°1; °2; e1; e2; w) + x2(°1; °2; e1; e2; w))
=
(w ¡ cu)(2a¡ 2c¡ d+ (1 + °1)e1 + (1 + °2)e2 ¡ 2w)
3
:
In the third stage, the upstream ¯rm sets the optimal w:
w(°1; °2; e1; e2) =
2(a¡ c+ cu)¡ d+ (1 + °1)e1 + (1 + °2)e2
4
: (6)
By using the aforementioned calculation result on xk(°1; °2; e1; e2; w) and w(°1; °2; e1; e2),
we calculate the investment levels and obtain the following result:
e1(°1; °2) =
(7¡ 5°1)(6(2(a¡ c¡ cu) + 5d)Á¡ (7¡ 5°2)((1¡ °2)(a¡ c¡ cu) + °2d))
864Á2 ¡ 6((7¡ 5°1)2 + (7¡ 5°2)2)Á+ (7¡ 5°1)(7¡ 5°2)(1¡ °1°2) ; (7)
e2(°1; °2) =
(7¡ 5°2)(6(2(a¡ c¡ cu)¡ 7d)Á¡ (7¡ 5°1)((1¡ °1)(a¡ c¡ cu)¡ d))
864Á2 ¡ 6((7¡ 5°1)2 + (7¡ 5°2)2)Á+ (7¡ 5°1)(7¡ 5°2)(1¡ °1°2) : (8)
Substituting ek(°1; °2) (k = 1; 2) into the pro¯t functions of the downstream ¯rms, we have:
¼1(°1; °2) ´ Á(144Á¡ (7¡ 5°1)
2)(e1(°1; °2))2
(7¡ 5°1)2 ;
¼2(°1; °2) ´ Á(144Á¡ (7¡ 5°2)
2)(e2(°1; °2))2
(7¡ 5°2)2 :
The pro¯t of the upstream ¯rm is
¼u(°1; °2) ´ 216Á
2K2
[864Á2 ¡ 6((7¡ 5°1)2 + (7¡ 5°2)2)Á+ (7¡ 5°1)(7¡ 5°2)(1¡ °1°2)]2 ; (9)
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whereK ´ 12(2(a¡c¡cu)¡d)Á¡(a¡c¡cu)
P2
i=1(1¡°i)(7¡5°i)+((7¡5°1)¡°2(7¡5°2))d):
The consumer surplus and the social surplus are:
CS(°1; °2) =
(x1(°1; °2) + x2(°1; °2))2
2
=
¼u(°1; °2)
3
; (10)
SW (°1; °2) ´ CS(°1; °2) + ¼u(°1; °2) +
2X
i=1
¼i(°1; °2): (11)
We must compare the pro¯ts of the upstream ¯rm in the four cases: (i) °1 = °2 = 0, (ii)
°1 = 0 and °2 = °, (iii) °1 = ° and °2 = 0, (iv) °1 = °2 = °. From the comparison, we
¯nd that ¼u(°; °) is the largest value among the four cases if and only if ° · 2=5 and that
¼u(0; 0) is the largest value among the four cases if and only if ° ¸ 2=5 (the calculation is
available upon request). This is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 It is optimal for the upstream ¯rm to use the technologies of both downstream
¯rms if and only if ° · 2=5. It is optimal for the upstream ¯rm to do nothing if and only if
° ¸ 2=5. If ° = 2=5, it is indi®erent for the upstream ¯rm to choose one of the four cases.
From the above comparison, we only have to compare cases (i) and (iv). Comparing
these two cases, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 CS(°; °) > CS(0; 0) if and only if ° < 2=5. ¼2(°; °) > ¼2(0; 0) for any °
and Á. ¼1(°; °) > ¼1(0; 0) if and only if d < ~dp(°; Á) such that ~dp(°; Á) satis¯es ¼1(°; °) =
¼1(0; 0). SW (°; °) > SW (0; 0) if and only if d < ~dw(°; Á) such that ~dw(°; Á) satis¯es
SW (°; °) = SW (0; 0).
The di®erence between ¼1(°; °) and ¼1(0; 0) is shown in the following ¯gure (this is the case
of Á = 3=2).
[Figure 2]
The di®erence between SW (°; °) and SW (0; 0) is shown in the following ¯gure (this is the
case of Á = 3=2).
[Figure 3]
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From the viewpoint of the downstream ¯rms, the investment reduction through the tech-
nology spillover does not necessarily have a negative impact on their pro¯tability. We now
brie°y explain the reason for this property. Basically, the downstream ¯rms have incentives
to make excessive investments to prevail over their competitors because the competition
structure between the downstream ¯rms is strategic substitution. This incentive will be re-
duced because of the technology leakage determined by the upstream ¯rm. The mitigation
of this intensive investment competition has a positive impact on the downstream ¯rms. In
particular, it has a more advantageous impact on the ine±cient downstream ¯rm with less
incentive for R&D. This is because the bene¯t of cost reduction for a downstream ¯rm is
proportional to its quantity supplied, whereas the investment cost does not depend on this
quantity as it does in the standard setting of R&D. Anticipating this asymmetry of tech-
nological spillover, the e±cient ¯rm reduces its R&D investment more than the ine±cient
¯rm does. When the ex ante cost di®erence between the downstream ¯rms is large, the
diminished incentive of the e±cient ¯rm for R&D investment decreases its pro¯t.
The upstream ¯rm's decision concerning this technology absorption has two e®ects: the
strategic e®ect mentioned above, and the direct e®ect of technology leakage. The former
decreases the total quantity supplied but the latter increases it. The latter positive e®ect is
small when the spillover e®ect is large (° is large). We brie°y explain the reason. The larger
the degree of spillover e®ect, the smaller are the equilibrium e®ort levels of the downstream
¯rms. The total amount of technology leakage is proportional to the equilibrium e®ort
levels. The two properties imply that the positive e®ect of a marginal increase in the degree of
spillover e®ect becomes weak as the degree of spillover e®ect becomes large. Therefore, when
the degree of spillover e®ect is large, the technology spillover caused by the decision of the
upstream ¯rm decreases the total quantity supplied by the downstream ¯rms. Anticipating
this negative e®ect, the upstream ¯rm does not absorb technologies from the downstream
¯rms when the degree of spillover e®ect is large. Note that the decrease in this total quantity
supplied also harms consumers.
The e®ect of technology absorption on the social surplus can be explained by the combina-
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tion of the abovementioned e®ects. When the ex ante cost heterogeneity is large, technology
absorption by the upstream ¯rm has a negative impact on the e±cient ¯rm. When the degree
of spillover e®ect is large, the technology absorption has negative impacts on the upstream
¯rm and consumers. The right-hand side of Figure 3 shows the combination of those two
properties.
5 Interpretation of analytical results
We derive the following results. It is only optimal for the upstream ¯rm (MS) to use tech-
nology from both e±cient and ine±cient downstream ¯rms (OEM suppliers) if the degree
of technology spillover is small. If MS may not commit \not to take over technology after
investment," it will exploit OEM suppliers' investment e®orts. For this reason, if the leakage
is large, MS should not introduce NAP provisions in some cases. If the preexisting cost gap
is signi¯cant, technology leakage will erode the pro¯ts of the e±cient OEM supplier. We
now interpret the result.
5.1 The JFTC decision
Arguments by the respondent (MS) (from Section 1) The NAP provisions are
reasonable provisions commonly used among technology-related ¯rms, including those in the
AV consumer electronics industry, to mitigate risks of patent infringement lawsuits and re-
duce the cost necessary to mitigate such risks while disseminating new technologies. Because
the NAP provisions would, by de¯nition, prevent patent infringement lawsuits, they could
potentially reduce corporate willingness to engage in R&D e®orts. In principle, if such an
abstract possibility is illegal, this is tantamount to recognizing that the NAP provisions are
in themselves illegal.
Decision by hearing examiners This hearing is to examine whether the NAP provisions
would violate the Antimonopoly Act and does not make decisions concerning the legality of
the NAP provisions. For this reason, the arguments made by MS are inappropriate.
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5.2 Applicability
The NAP provisions generally suggest that if MS may use OEM technologies, it is assumed
to employ a large quantity of OEM technologies. On the other hand, from the viewpoint
of OEM suppliers, a quality gap may erode the pro¯ts of a high-quality OEM supplier;
incentives for investment may also be compromised with a cost gap between the e±cient
and ine±cient ¯rms. In other words, if we discuss the contracts containing these provisions
in relation to the Antimonopoly Act, and OEM suppliers have a technology gap, then it is
necessary to pay due attention to the possibility that the NAP provisions erode the pro¯ts
of e±cient OEM suppliers or interfere with OEM suppliers' incentives to invest. This is also
related to OEM suppliers' viewpoints expressed in the JFTC decision.
The JFTC decision (taken from the hearing examiners' judgment, page
114, JFTC Decisions) As recognized in 3(1)A above, because the NAP pro-
visions will be applicable in the future, they will apply to licensed products as
well as future products and will be in e®ect for a very long time. In addition,
because a wide variety of patent rights may fall under free licenses as a result of
the expansion of the Windows series capabilities, the JFTC determines as follows.
[: : :] MS has expanded/enhanced the AV capabilities of Windows series, and sev-
eral OEM suppliers have expressed their concern that the NAP provisions would
have an impact on their patent rights in relation to their own PC AV technolo-
gies (Panasonic has expressed concerns about AV technology patents in general;
Sony has concerns about the standard speci¯cations of \MPEG-1," \MPEG-
2," \IEEE1394," \MPEG-4" AV, digital video broadcasting and its multime-
dia platform; Toshiba has expressed concerns about the standard speci¯cations
of \IEEE1394," \MPEG-2" AV and \MPEF-4" AV|Attachment (1), Written
Statement (2), Respondent's Brief (3)) and they requested that MS remove the
NAP provisions. From these viewpoints, while recognizing that their PC AV
technologies would be incorporated into the Windows series, OEM suppliers had
no choice but to develop their own PC AV technologies.
We have shown that the diminishment in the e±cient ¯rm's incentive for R&D decreases
its pro¯t if the ex ante cost di®erence between the downstream ¯rms is large. Because the
JFTC decision recognizes that large corporations such as Panasonic, Sony, and Toshiba and
perhaps other highly e±cient ¯rms had concerns about NAP provisions, the above analysis
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is on point in its theoretical implications. In response to NAP provisions, Sharp and Sotec
did not request MS to remove or amend the NAP provisions; Sharp had few patent rights in
PC-use OS and Sotec specialized in selling PCs without customizing the Windows series.
As for the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competition policies, it is suggested
that a dominant ¯rm in the PC OS market such as MS would occupy a more advantageous
position than new entrants that do not use NAP provisions. However, if NAP provisions
are \reasonable provisions commonly used among technological ¯rms, including the AV con-
sumer electronics industry," it is di±cult to imagine new entrants not using NAP provisions
in reality. Furthermore, concerning the negative impacts of NAP provisions on competi-
tion policies, MS may have had problems in introducing the NAP provisions or negotiating
possible amendments with OEM suppliers; however, this paper does not analyze this topic.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a theoretical background to the JFTC decision on the MS case in
which JFTC decided to commence hearing proceedings on September 1, 2004, delivering
its decision on September 16, 2008, in accordance with the Antimonopoly Act. This JFTC
decision ruled that the Act had been violated in the following way. When MS directly
negotiated with personal computer production/sales ¯rms in Japan from January 1, 2001, to
July 31, 2004, to enter into contracts licensing OEM sales of MS Windows (\OS"), it forced
the licensed OEM suppliers to accept NAP provisions. MS set contract terms with OEM
suppliers that would unduly restrain OEM suppliers' business activities. Some issues in the
MS case remain in dispute. We analyze the case by setting up simple theoretical models,
focusing on the following three points:
1. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D ac-
tivities concerning PC/AV technologies before July 31, 2004.
2. Whether OEM suppliers were very likely to become less motivated in their R&D ac-
tivities concerning PC/AV technologies even after August 1, 2004.
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3. Whether NAP provisions have a negative impact on competition in PC/AV technology
trading or PC markets.
The theoretical model yielded the following result. If the technology of an OEM supplier
is introduced into MS' OS, and the marginal cost of the other OEM supplier decreases, then
using the technologies of these two OEM suppliers is optimal for MS as long as technology
leakage is small. If technology leakage is large, MS should not introduce NAP provisions. In
addition, if the preexisting cost gap is signi¯cant, technology leakage will erode the pro¯t of
the e±cient OEM supplier.
This analysis implies that OEM suppliers face di®erent impacts depending on their po-
sition in the downstream market and that OEM suppliers should o®er factual evidence that
considers such perspectives. For example, if OEM suppliers have a technology gap, they
should clarify possible problems in competition policies, because these problems might dam-
age the pro¯ts of e±cient OEM suppliers or remove their incentive to invest. On the other
hand, our analysis also reveals that quanti¯cation of these impacts requires careful review.
It may be necessary to examine how to respond to the dominant position of MS in the
market, although this paper does not cover such a topic. The JFTC decision argues that MS
has a problem because it \keeps using" NAP provisions despite having achieved dominance
in the market. The decision also indicates that it is a problem that a dominant supplier uses
NAP provisions and that the network e®ect would serve to further enhance MS' dominant
status. Antimonopoly Act experts often state that it is no problem, from the viewpoint of
the Antimonopoly Act, for new entrants to adopt such an approach because it encourages
competition, but it becomes a problem if it is used by a supplier with dominant status.
15
References
[1] d'Aspremont, Claude and Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. Cooperative and noncooperative
R&D in duopoly with spillovers, American Economic Review 78, 1133{37.
[2] Mar¶³a Jos¶e Gil-Molt¶o, Nikolaos Georgantz¶³s, Vicente Orts, 2005. Cooperative R&D with
endogenous technology di®erentiation Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
14, 461{476.
[3] Ishii, Akira, 2004. Cooperative R&D between vertically related ¯rms with spillovers.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 1213{1235.
[4] Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2004. Vertical integration and R&D information °ow: is there
a need for `¯rewalls'? International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 25{43.
[5] Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2009. Endogenous protection of R&D investments. Canadian
Journal of Economics 42, 184{205.
[6] Piga, Claudio and Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 2005. Endogenous R&D spillovers and
locational choice. Regional Science and Urban Economics 35, 127{139.
[7] Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1999. A note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament
R&D duopoly. Review of Industrial Organization 15, 253{262.
[8] Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in oligopoly with
spillovers. American Economic Review 82, 1307{1320.
[9] Versaevel, Bruno and Vencatachellum, D¶esir¶e, 2009. R&D delegation in a duopoly with
spillovers, The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (Contributions) 9, Article
55.
16
MS
OEM1
w w
OEM2
Consumers
x1 x2
e2e1
MS
OEM1
w w
OEM2
Consumers
x1 x2
e2e1
°
No absorption Absorbing the technology of ¯rm 1
MS
OEM1
w w
OEM2
Consumers
x1 x2
e2e1
°
MS
OEM1
w w
OEM2
Consumers
x1 x2
e2e1
°°
Absorbing the technology of ¯rm 2 Absorbing both technologies
Figure 1: The market structure
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Figure 2: The e®ect of technology spillover on the e±cient OEM supplier
(Left-hand) x-axis: °, y-axis: d, z-axis: ¼1(°; °)¡ ¼1(0; 0),
(Right-hand) x-axis: °, y-axis: d, Shaded region: ¼1(°; °) > ¼1(0; 0).
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Figure 3: The e®ect of technology spillover on the social surplus
(Left-hand) x-axis: °, y-axis: d, z-axis: SW (°; °)¡ SW (0; 0),
(Right-hand) x-axis: °, y-axis: d, Shaded region: SW (°; °) > SW (0; 0).
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